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I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution explicitly assures us that during peacetime, no soldier can
be quartered in our home without our consent.' On the question of the actual
availability of any sort of home in the first place, however, the federal
Constitution2 and many state constitutions 3 are less forthcoming. Many persons
are, for one reason or another, chronically left involuntarily homeless.4
. Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis.
The author's thanks go to Kristen Adams, Emily Benfer, Florence Roisman, and Rachel Anne
Scherer.I U.S. CONST. amend. Ill.
2 The closest we have to an authoritative pronouncement on the question of any such
federal constitutional right is the Court's announcement in Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74
(1972) that "[we] are unable to perceive... any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings
of a particular quality ......
3 See generally Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449,451 (N.Y. 1977) ("[i]n New York State,
the provision for assistance to the needy is not a matter of legislative grace; rather, it is
specifically mandated by our [State] Constitution."). The court in Tucker adds that "[t]he
legislative history of the Constitutional Convention of 1938 is indicative of a clear intent that
State aid to the needy was deemed to be a fundamental part of the social contract." Id. In the
housing assistance context, see Jiggetts v. Grinker, 553 N.E.2d 570, 572 (N.Y. 1990) (citing
Tucker, 553 N.E. at 572) (program allowances forcing many families with minor children into
homelessness as not meeting the relevant statutory standard). See also Hodge v. Ginsberg, 303
S.E.2d 245, 251 (W. Va. 1983) (granting petition for writ of mandamus directing relevant state
agency to provide emergency shelter and other aid to incapacitated adults at "substantial and
immediate risk of death or serious permanent injury"). By its terms, the writ in question in
Hodge was thus relatively narrow and limited. At a state statutory level, see Williams v. Dep't
of Human Serv., 561 A.2d 244, 255 (N.J. 1989) (quoting 1984 state statute to the effect that "[i]t
is the longstanding policy of this State that no person should suffer unnecessarily from cold or
hunger, or be deprived of shelter") (citation omitted). See also L.T. v. New Jersey Dep't of
Human Serv., 633 A.2d 964, 967 (N.J. 1993); B.N. v. Dep't of Human Serv., 670 A.2d 1111
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996). Finding no relevant state constitutional or statutory right to
housing, see, for example, Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742 (Conn. 1995). More generally, see
Mitchell v. Steffen, 504 N.W.2d 198,203 (Minn. 1993) (no state constitutional right to welfare);
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Our legal culture generally addresses such matters under the category of
individual rights, or at best the rights of homeless families.5 There may
ultimately be little harm in thinking of homelessness in terms of recognizing or
denying rights-claims. And in our legal culture, we may have little realistic
choice but to focus on claims and denials of rights or entitlements. Still,
perhaps something important is missed by our not thinking more explicitly in
terms of whether we have a strong moral duty or obligation toward homeless
persons, or in terms of the idea of fraternity.
The analysis below devotes attention to the legal status of the idea of
fraternity, and to related ideas. We do not naturally think of fraternity entirely
in terms of individual rights and entitlements. In contrast, we do think naturally
enough of liberty rights, and of rights to be treated equally in various respects.
Fraternity or solidarity, however, is not so centrally a matter of claimed
individual rights. Perhaps, again, this ultimately makes little difference. But if
homelessness is largely a matter of something like the absence of an inclusive
Daugherty v. Wallace, 621 N.E.2d 1374, 1378 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (same); Kratzer v.
Commonwealth, 481 A.2d 1380, 1382 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (same); Allen v. Graham, 446
P.2d 240, 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968) ("[t]he State has no common law or constitutional duty to
support its poor."); Beck v. Buena Park Hotel Corp., 196 N.E.2d 686, 688 (Ill. 1964) (same);
Div. ofAid for the Aged v. Hogan, 54 N.E.2d 781, 782 (Ohio 1944) (same).
4 For some unavoidably imperfect and definition-sensitive national estimates, see National
Alliance to End Homelessness, Homelessness Counts (January 10, 2007),
http://www.endhomelessness.org/content/general/detail/1440.
5 For a mere sampling of the literature, see, for example, Curtis J. Berger, Beyond
Homelessness: An Entitlement to Housing, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 315, 324-25 (199 1) (arguing
for a fundamental such right, but not necessarily at the federal constitutional level); Robert C.
Ellickson, The Untenable Case for an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 17, 18-19 (1992) (responding to the affirmative arguments of others partly on grounds of
the counter-productivity of comprehensive guaranteed rights packages); Florence Wagman
Roisman, Establishing a Right to Housing: An Advocate's Guide, 428 PLI LmG. HANDBOOK
SERIES 9, 17 (1992) ("A right to housing is emerging in the United States. It is rooted not
primarily in federal constitutional doctrine, but rather in state lawmaking and state court
litigation involving state constitutions and state statutes."); Dennis D. Hirsch, Note, Making
Shelter Work: Placing Conditions on an Employable Person's Right to Shelter, 100 YALE L.J.
491 (1990); Geoffrey Mort, Note, Establishing a Right to Shelter for the Homeless, 50 BROOK.
L. REv. 939 (1984). At the level of human rights claims, see, for example, NATIONAL LAW
CENTER ON HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY, HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO HOUSING i (January 14, 2004),
http://www.nlchp.org/content/pubs/homelessnessintheUSandrightstohousing.pdf (noting the
reference to adequate housing rights in Article 25(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights).
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sense of fraternity, the homeless are at a cultural disadvantage in expressing
their voice in a legal culture of rights.6
In fact, we shall argue below that fraternity and solidarity, or their absence,
are central to understanding what is missing from our legal and specifically
constitutional responses to homelessness. 7 In particular, we argue crucially that
lack of various liberties8 and equalities, 9 despite their importance in other con-
texts, are not as central to what is most deeply objectionable about homeless-
ness as is the lack of fraternity.
In a phrase, involuntary homelessness is more deeply, more centrally, and
more precisely about lack of fraternity or solidarity than it is about lack of
liberty or equality, carefully understood. And this is in turn unfortunate for the
homeless, because of the nature of our Constitution. Homelessness and the
main themes of our Constitution are a mismatch. We can imagine a constitu-
tional culture that gives weight not only to liberty and equality, but to fraternity
as well. 10 But our own constitutional tradition has focused on liberty and
equality, and has de-emphasized fraternity and its cognates. If, as we argue, it
is lack of fraternity that is crucial to homelessness, and liberty or equality, care-
fully understood, only to a lesser degree, we have made substantial progress
toward doctrinally understanding the marginal status of the homeless under our
constitutional order.
II. WHAT'S WRONG WITH HOMELESSNESS?
Developing a satisfying theory of the basic moral wrongness of chronic,
involuntary homelessness in an advanced post-industrial society is surprisingly
troublesome. For this, there turn out to be a number of reasons.
One might imagine, first, that the sight of a particular homeless person
would tend to evoke a more or less hard-wired sense of empathy.' But
6 For a controversial discussion of our collective focus on rights-claims, see MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991).
7 See infra Part H.
8 See infra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 103-17 and accompanying text.
1o See infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
11 For discussion of the scope and limitations thereof, see, for example, MARC D. HAUSER,
MORAL MINDS: How NATURE DESIGNED OUR UNIVERSAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG (2006);
RICHARD JOYCE, THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY (2006); EVOLUTION AND ETHICS: HUMAN
MORALITY IN BIOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE (Philip Clayton & Jeffrey Schloss eds.,
2004); PETER SINGER, A DARWINIAN LEFT: POLIncs, EVOLUTION AND COOPERATION (1999).
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homelessness can evoke indifference, if not discomfort and hostility, as well. It
has been observed that "homelessness is not just the condition of lacking a
home in the sense of a 'roof over one's head.' It is the .. condition of not
being acknowledged as belonging to society .... [1]n practice we act as if they
do not even exist." 12 Even our collective attempts to assist the homeless can
bespeak a certain submerged contempt.' 3
Despite our ambivalence with regard to the homeless, there is also a sense
that assisting the homeless is somehow beyond-perhaps above, or beneath-
any articulated moral justification. The well-known philosopher Alasdair
Maclntyre has thus concluded that "to ask for some deeper justification or
sufficient reason for assisting one who is starving or ... freezing to death is
itself a sign of defective virtue."' 14
Perhaps one could say that for many of us, our certainty that it is right to
rescue the homeless person from death by exposure is greater than our certainty
of the correctness of any particular moral theory justifying such a rescue.
Perhaps our conviction of the moral rightness of rescuing such a homeless
person might be stronger even than our confidence in any combination of
underlying moral theories.
Yet there is clearly important moral thinking to be done. And Professor
Maclntyre himself enters into the realm of moral justification in saying that
"[t]he stranger's urgent need provides a sufficient reason for going to her or his
12 Keith Burkum, Homelessness, Virtue Theory, and the Creation of Community, in THE
ETHICS OF HOMELESSNESS: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 79, 79 (G. John M. Abbrano ed.,
1999). See also id. at 80 (what some persons perceive as uncomfortable or "aggressive"
panhandling may in some instances reflect a need for social recognition or acknowledgment as
opposed to a backgroundedness to the point of invisibility).
13 One not entirely atypical account refers to a Washington, D.C. homeless shelter that
"was full of vermin, had broken windows and large holes in the walls, and only one working
shower for five hundred men." Anita Superson, The Homeless and the Right to 'Public
Dwelling,' in THE ETHICS OF HOMELESSNESS: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECIVES 141, 146 (G. John
M. Abbrano ed., 1999). More subjectively, consider the report by a shelter resident:
What you fear is that you will be here forever .... Sometimes I think: It's an
experiment. They are watching you to find out how much you can take. Someone
will come someday and say: 'Okay this guy has suffered long enough. Now we'll
take him back into our world.' Then you wake up and get in line ....
JONATHAN KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN: HoMELEss FAMriiEs IN AMERICA 217 (reprint ed.




aid."' 5 The idea of a 'need' and even of meeting an urgent need, may be
murky, 16 but with this concept of need we have clearly begun an attempt to
provide a moral account for our rescuing the homeless person.
In fact, on some theories, establishing housing or shelter as a genuine need
can be morally decisive. It has thus been argued that "[q]uestions about human
needs are questions about human obligations. To ask what our needs are is to
ask not just which of our desires are strongest and most urgent, but which of
our desires give us an entitlement to the resources of others."'17
This is not to suggest that 'needs,' even in the realm of housing, cannot be
artificially stimulated, manipulated, contrived, or expanded in some arbitrary
cultural process of dubious moral weight.'8 The 'need' for housing in a sense
exists along a cultural continuum and is in that sense quite variable. 19
There are some limits, however, to the deconstructability of the need for
shelter. In a cold climate, for example, the risk of freezing to death as a result
of inadequate insulation from the elements is not simply some conventional
construct. There is thus an inescapable point to saying, with Professor David
Braybrooke,2° that "every human being needs... some clothing, some shelter,
some heat.",21 Minimal human social functioning and basic social role
22fulfillment underwrite housing in this sense as a genuine need.
15 id.
16 See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. HAMILTON, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF NEEDS 27-31 (2003)
(discussing "vital" and "basic" needs, including shelter or protection from the elements,
classically thought to be biological, acultural, and apolitical, and thus fixed and universal, but
on Hamilton's approach historically, culturally, and politically conditioned and fulfillable in
various ways and degrees, making a strict distinction between 'needs' and 'wants'
unsustainable).
17 MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 27 (1985).
18 For a classical review, see, THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS
(Houghton Mifflin ed. 1973) (1899); JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT Soc-ETY (New
American Library 2d rev. ed. 1969) (1958).
19 See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. HAMILTON, supra note 16, at 27-3 1.20 DAvID BRAYBROOKE, MEETING NEEDS (1987).
21 Id. at 44. Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, Social Justice and Universalism: In Defense of an
Aristotelian Account of Human Functioning, 90 MODERN PHILOLOGY (Supp.) S46, S58 (1993)
(discussing "adequate shelter" in terms of "basic human functional capabilities").22 See DAvID BRAYBROOKE, supra note 20, at 44,47; Martha C. Nussbaum, supra note 21,
at S58. For useful reviews of Braybrooke's theory of needs, see Gordon Graham, David
Braybrooke, The Meeting of Needs, 38 PHIL. Q. 381 (1988) (book review); Alan Wertheimer,
Braybrooke, Meeting Needs, 17 POL. THEORY 330 (1989) (book review). See also Marvin
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A focus on the idea of need as a crucial moral category, at least near the
margins of subsistence and survival, has a distinguished pedigree. Remarkably,
Thomas Aquinas concluded that in the absence of any other remedy, relieving
one's manifest and urgent need by taking from the surplus of another, whether
openly or secretly, is lawful and does not amount to theft.23 More pointedly, St.
Bonaventure quotes St. Francis of Assisi to the following effect: "I believe the
great Almsgiver will charge me with theft if I do not give what I have to one
who needs it more. '24 Even the perceived champion of individual property
rights, John Locke, emphasizes the public and private duty to sustain those with
at best a tenuous hold on the bare necessities.25
Still, we cannot say that the idea of need by itself supplies a complete
understanding of the moral landscape of involuntary homelessness. The idea of
need plays a role in such an understanding, but only in conjunction with an
overlapping, mutually supportive "cluster 26 of related concepts. The idea of
meeting a need by itself will not suffice.
If we are to understand the moral dimensions of homelessness and home-
lessness policy in an economically advanced society, we must, for example,
think as well in terms of ideas such as community, community membership,
Zetterbaum, Equality and Human Need, 71 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 983,988-89 (1977) (discussing
purportedly objective or empirically-grounded basic need typologies).2 3 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA H-Il, qu. 66, art. 7, respondio (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans.) (2d rev. ed. 1920) available at
http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3066.htm (online ed. Kevin Knight 2003). Cf. LORD JOHN
ACTON, 3 SELECTED WRITINGS OF LORD ACTON: ESSAYS IN RELIGION, POLmCS, AND MORALrrY
552 (J. Rufus Fears ed. 1988) (1881) ("[ploverty has its rights as well as property").
24 BONAVENTURE, The Life of St. Francis, in THE SOUL'S JouRNEY INTO GOD, THE TREE OF
LIFE, AND THE LIFE OF ST. FRANCIS 177, 254 (Ewert Cousins trans. 1978) (1263).
25 For discussion of Locke's views in the context of homelessness, see Alexander Tsesis,
Eliminating the Destitution of America's Homeless: A Fair, Federal Approach, 10 TEMP. POL.
& CIv. RTS. L. REv. 103, 119-20 (2000).
26 The relationships among this "cluster" of concepts thus differ somewhat from the
typically looser, more independent relationships among the components of what are referred to
as "cumulative case" arguments. For general discussion, see R. George Wright, Cumulative
Case Legal Arguments and the Justification ofAcademic Affirmative Action, 23 PACE L. REv. 1,
4 (2002) (citing cumulative case arguments in a range of academic disciplines) ("[w]e may be
able to establish a belief or value, to any degree of certainty, only through the somehow
combined force of a number of different items of evidence, each of which, by itself, may lack
real power to persuade"). See also James W. Nickel, Poverty and Rights, 55 PHIL. Q. 385, 391
(2005) ("If a right has multiple justifications, the failure of one will be less likely to call the
right's justification into doubt."). See generally id. at 388 (referring to environmentally
appropriate shelter).
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and promoting the common good of the community. 27 In particular, we must
notice that not all communities are mere separationist enclaves or literal gated
communities, limited on the basis of economic class or wealth, as distinct from
a more inclusive community pursuing the broader common good. 8
The great social theorist Georg Simmel recognized that the poor are
obviously in some minimal sense incorporated into the social totality.29 But the
poor may also crucially be outsiders, or nonmembers. Simmel writes that "[t]he
poor are approximately in the situation of the stranger to the group who finds
himself, so to speak, materially outside the group in which he resides.30
Developing this theme as morality and public policy, David Hollenbach has
indicated specifically that "[p]oor people who are unemployed, inadequately
housed, and undereducated in American inner cities are not part of a society
that can be called a commonwealth.,, 31 Hollenbach's view is that "[n]o one
who is a citizen of a functioning community should be relegated to the sidelines
of social interaction .... 32 Each citizen, as an appropriately acknowledged
constituent member of the community, should seek to promote the community's
27 For general background, see, for example, THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY: READINGS
WITH INTERPRETATIONS (David W. Minar & Scott Greer eds. 1969). See also WILL KYMLICKA,
LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1991) (discussing communitarian critiques of
liberalism and liberalism's often-claimed official neutrality as among various conceptions of
what constitutes a good life for persons); JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION 301
(2004) ("Communitarians refer to communities as constituted by common ends ....") Of
special interest are DOUGLAS STURM, SOLIDARrrY AND SUFFERING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF
RELATIONALIrrY 15 (1998) (distinguishing a robust, pluralistic, inclusive conception of
community from a narrower sense of community); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE
LIMITS OFJUSTICE 148-52 (1982) (discussing stronger and weaker conceptions of community in
the context of John Rawls' Theory of Justice).
28 See, e.g., David Hollenbach, The Common Good and Urban Poverty, AMERICA, June 5-
12, 1999, at 8, 10 (the bonds forged within such enclaves as more like social club relationships
than bonds "among fellow citizens concerned for the good of the wider community"); Ronald
Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 501-02 (1989) (discussing a sense of an
inseparability ofjustice and the value of one's own life from justice for all of the members of the
broader community).29 See GEORG SIMMEL, The Poor, in ON INDIVIDUALrrY AND SOCIAL FORMS 150, 158
(Donald N. Levine ed., Univ. Chicago Press 1971) (1908).30 ld. See also Burkum, supra note 12, at 80.
31 DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 202 (2002).
32 Id. Somewhat less inclusively, the sociologist Robert Nisbet wrote that "the claims of
freedom and cultural autonomy will never have recognition until the great majority of
individuals in society have a sense of cultural membership in the significant and meaningful
relationships of kinship, religion, occupation, profession, and locality." Robert A. Nisbet, The
Quest for Community 283 (1953) (emphasis added).
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common good, even as the well-being of all individual community members is
an element precisely of the community's common good.33
This acknowledgment and inclusion of the marginal figure and his or her
interests will in turn require further explanation. Sometimes, we can recur to
the fulfillment of vital needs, as discussed above,34 at least as one element of a
normative approach to homelessness. But other, admittedly closely related,
approaches will also be of assistance.
Some moral theorists, for example, are interested in one variety or another
of what is called 'perfectionism,' including a distinctly egalitarian version of
perfectionism, under which an aim of the society and the law is to promote the
projects and distinctive excellences of each person.35 We may assume that no
such version of egalitarian perfectionism can be fulfilled if any number of
persons must devote too much energy and attention to ensuring merely that they
have arrangements for a roof over their heads, and other insulation against the
elements.
Relatedly, though, some would also argue that involuntary, chronic home-
lessness in an economically advanced constitutional democracy disrespects the
intrinsic worth or essential dignity of the person. There could be multiple
grounds-subjective or objective-for finding indignity in such cases. Without
relying on anything that is especially controversial in the work of the philos-
opher Immanuel Kant,36 one could certainly object to homelessness on grounds
3 3 See, e.g., MARK C. MURPHY, NATURAL LAW IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PoLmCs 86 (2006)
("Each person in a political community is bound to act for the common good of that
community."); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, supra note 14, at 156 (in light especially of our
acknowledged mostly mutual dependencies).
34 See supra text accompanying notes 15-25.
35 For modem discussion of perfectionist themes extending back at least to Aristotle, see,
for example, ViNrr HAKSAR, EQUALITY, LIBERTY AND PERFECTION (1979); PHILIPPA FOOT,
NATURAL GOODNESS (2003); and most especially THOMAS HURKA, PERFECTIONISM (1993). For
useful reviews of Hurka, see Michael Stocker, Some Comments on Perfectionism, 105 ETHICS
386 (1995) (book review); Tim Mulgan, Review of Perfectionism, 103 MIND 553 (1994) (book
review). From the Enlightenment Era, see Antoine-Nicolas de Condorcet, Sketch for a
Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, in Selected Writings 209, 279 (Keith
Michael Baker ed. 1976) (1793) ("No one can doubt that, as... housing becomes healthier...
better health will be ensured.").
36 For Kant's own admittedly distinctive formulation, see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK
OFTHE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor trans. & ed.) (Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 1998)
(1785). For discussion, see THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNrrY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT'S
MORAL THEORY (1992); ALLEN W. WOOD, KANT'S ETHICAL THOUGHT 115 (1999). For a
somewhat broader focus, see Izhak Englard, Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modem Israel's
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of the various sorts of indignities, personal and social, associated with
homelessness.
Interestingly, the sense of the unforfeitability and inviolability of the dignity
of the person can then be carried over into the related realm of love of neighbor,
or agape. A leading scholar thus writes that "[algape is a regard for the
neighbor which in crucial respects is independent and unalterable" 37 and on that
basis links to the idea of a universal "irreducible worth and dignity., 38
We need take no position on the legitimate role, if any, for love of neighbor
in accounting for any moral or legal obligations we may hold with respect to
homelessness. Certainly, any such argument may seem distasteful or legally
inappropriate on a number of grounds. The Victorian political theorist Sir
James Fitzjames Stephen doubtless spoke for many in arguing that "it is not
love that one wants from the great mass of mankind, but respect and justice., 39
Suffice it to say, though, that some accounts of agape or neighbor love actually
emphasize not any sort of passion, but instead a sense of universal equality,4°
and an unwillingness to prefer or to discriminate on unjustified grounds.4'
Justice and agape, on some accounts, can thus be closely related.42
Specifically, it has been argued that agape establishes the possibilities,
favorable and unfavorable, for community life.43 In any event, something like
the agapic commitment to equal dignity, to radical equality, or to self-gift has
been thought to imply a basic right to housing in particular.44 But even where
Constitutional Framework, 21 CARDOZO L. REv. 1903 (2000); Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds
of Respect, 88 ETHICS 36 (1977) (distinguishing 'recognition respect' from 'appraisal respect').
See also RICHARD SENNETr, RESPECT IN A WORLD OF INEQUALrrY (2004).37 GENE OUTKA, AGAPE: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS 9 (1972).
38 Id. at 13. Outka also closely links agape with the relief of needs, and relief of suffering,
largely independent of merit or desert. See id. at 91.39 JAMEs FTZJAMEs STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALrrTY, FRATERNITY 164 (Stuart D. Warner ed.
1993) (1874).
40 See SOREN KIERKEGAARD, WORKS OF LovE 67, 72 (Howard Hong & Edna Hong trans.)
(Harper ed. 1962) (1847).
41 See id. Kierkegaard carefully distinguishes condescending to one's assumed social or
economic inferiors. See id. at 72. For a contemporary approach, see TIMOTHY P. JACKSON, THE
PRIORrrY OF LovE 10 (2003) ("[Algape involves ... unconditional willing of the good for the
other... equal regard for the well-being of the other, and.., passionate service open to self-
sacrifice for the sake of the other.").
42 See Walter Harrison, The Idea of Agape in the New Testament, 31 J. RELIGION 169, 178
(1951).
43 See id.
44 See, for example, the discussion of the conclusions reached in David Hollenbach,
Human Rights in Catholic Thought, AMERICA, Oct. 31, 2005,
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agape underlies a specific concern for sheltering the homeless, some emphasis
on other elements noted above of the same familiar "cluster" of related
arguments is also helpful and likely. One official church document4 5 on
homelessness, for example, refers not only to love of neighbor, 46 but variously
as well to fulfillment 47 or perfectionism, to dignity,48 to basic needs,49 and to the
desire of homeless persons "to integrate themselves normally into society., 50
The same document also refers crucially to the value of solidarity5 1 with
homeless persons and with the poor in general. The value of social solidarity is
not merely another of the closely related "cluster values" commonly associated
with a critique of homelessness policy. Solidarity, along with its close cog-
nates,52 crucially fraternity, actually offers the clearest path to understanding the
constitutional status, or lack thereof, of involuntary homelessness.
The idea of solidarity can be thought of in an unduly narrow sense, as in the
cases of mere kinship solidarity, team or class solidarity, or solidarity with
one's fellow trade union members, all thought of in an exclusionary way.53 But
the idea of solidarity is open to more encompassing and inclusive uses as well,
in ways that illustrate its affinities with the "cluster" concepts referred to above.
Thus Professor Michael Ignatieff holds that the initial idea of 'needs'
implies "that human beings actually feel a common and shared identity in the
basic fraternity of hunger, thirst, cold, exhaustion, loneliness or sexual passion.
The possibility of human solidarity rests on this idea of natural human
http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/rvp/pubaf/05/HollenbachAmerica.html. ("[T]he Compendium
strongly affirms that all have the right to basic necessities, such as food, housing, just wages and
adequate social security.").
45 See Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, On the International Year of Shelter for the
Homeless (1991), http://www.catholicculture.org (search "On the International Year of Shelter
for the Homeless"; then follow "On the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless"
hyperlink).
46 See id. at § 2, Conclusion.47 See id. at § 2.
48 See id.
49 See id.50 Id. at Conclusion.
51 See id.
52 For an attempt to distinguish solidarity from several admittedly similar concepts, see
Christian Arnsperger & Yanis Varoufakis, Toward a Theory of Solidarity, 59 ERKENNTNIS 157
(2003), available at http://www.springerlink.comlcontent/rl5gl47p22107p2l/fulltext.pdf.53 Neutral as among narrow and broadly encompassing notions would be solidarity as a set
of dispositions associated with "strong feelings of cooperation, mutual identification, and
similarity of status and position." Lawrence Crocker, Equality, Solidarity, and Rawls'Maximin,
6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 262, 263 (1977).
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identity., 54 Similarly, it has been argued that "[f]rom a common good per-
spective... justice calls for the minimal level of solidarity required to enable
all of society's members to live with basic dignity.'"55 At its most expansive,
the idea of solidarity is said to have "dimensions of compassion, reconciliation,
generosity, forgiveness, fidelity, love, justice, and collaboration...., 56
This is not to suggest that the idea of inclusive solidarity is always thought
to carry deep metaphysical commitments. Solidarity without much metaphy-
sics, or even a deep anthropology, has been a central theme in the political
writings of the pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty. Rorty thus writes that
solidarity is not thought of as recognition of a core self, the human essence, in
all human beings. Rather, it is thought of as the ability to see more and more
traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and the like) as
unimportant when compared with similarities with respect to pain and
humiliation-the ability to think of people wildly different from us ourselves
as included in the range of "us."' 57
The idea of solidarity has understandably been closely linked, conceptually
and historically, with the idea of fraternity. And it is the historical path of the
idea of fraternity that sheds the greatest light on the marginal constitutional
status of the homeless today.
54 IGNATIEFF, supra note 17, at 28.
55 DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRiSTiAN ETmcs 192 (2002).56 MARI VIANNEY BILGREN, SOLIDARITY: A PRINCIPLE, AN ATTITUDE, A DUTY? OR THE
VIRTUE FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD? 1 (1999). Bilgren also sees "community, unity, hope,
mutual good, [and] responsibility for and trust in one another" as "basic components of
solidarity." Id. at 3. Almost as multi-facetedly, solidarity has been defined in terms of "shared
membership characterized by mutual care and mutual respect, that is, a sense of belonging
enriched by a commitment to human dignity-to love one's neighbor as oneself." Francis J.
Schweigert, Solidarity and Subsidiarity: Complementary Principles of Community Develop-
ment, 33 J. Soc. PHIL. 33, 33 (2002).57 RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 192 (1988). See also H.O.
MOUNCE, THE Two PRAGMATISMS: FROM PIERCE TO RORTY 201 (1997) (according to Rorty,
"there is no tendency to solidarity in human nature; indeed Rorty denies that human beings have
a common nature. Nevertheless, he exhorts us to create that solidarity."). See also John
McDowell, Toward Rehabilitating Objectivity, in RORTY AND His CRITICs 109, 110 (Robert B.
Brandom ed., 2000) ("Rorty's call is to abandon the discourse, the vocabulary, of objectivity,
and work instead towards expanding human solidarity."); Charles Guignon & David R. Hiley,
Introduction: Richard Rorty and Contemporary Philosophy, in RICHARD RORTY 1, 24 (Charles
Guignon & David R. Hiley eds., 2003).
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I1. LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND FRATERNITY
When we think of the historical rise of the Western liberal political state,
we think of the French Revolutionary Republic and of the triadic values of
liberty, equality, and fraternity. It has even been suggested that "modernity
might be characterized by the three words of the motto of the French Republic:
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity."58
Despite the associations between fraternity and certain understandings of
liberty and equality, the three values have not been historically inseparable.
The 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, for example,
clearly and explicitly emphasizes liberty and equality, but not the value of
fraternity. 59 The value of fraternity in fact got off to a bit of a late start, and in
substantive terms, to something of an early downplaying, if not an early exit.
Thus the historian William Doyle writes that
[i]f we know nothing else about the French Revolution, we know that it
spawned the famous motto adopted for the state by the Third Republic and
never abandoned since, except by the Vichy regime: Liberty, Equality,
Fraternity. In historical fact, fraternity came late, appearing only in 1793, and
went soon, being largely abandoned by the end of 1794 as a now-redundant
sop to the sanscoulottes. 60
Rather quickly, the idea of fraternity was thus widely seen as an unneces-
sary concession to the poor,61 if not as an unrealistic62 or utopian 63 notion. 64
58 Jean-Marie Cardinal Lustiger, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 76 FIRSTTHINGS 38 (1997),
available at http://www.firstthings.com/article.php3?idarticle=3745.
59 See, e.g., DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CrrizEN (France 1789) available at
http://www.columbia.edu/-iw6/docs/decright.html.
60 WILLIAM DOYLE, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REvOLUTION 419 (2d ed. 2002).
61 See id.
62 Consider Thomas Carlyle's rather critical assessment of the idea of fraternity in the
context of the Reign of Terror, in which "[f]ratemity, out of old Catholicism, does, it is true,
very strangely in the vehicle of a Jean-Jacques [Rousseau] Evangel, suddenly plump down out
of its cloud-firmament; and from a theorem determine to make itself a practice." THOMAS
CARLYLE, THE FRENCH REvOLUTION: A HISTORY 635 (Modem Library ed. 1934) (1837).
63 See id.; SIMON SCHAMA, CmzENS: ACHRONiCLE OFTHE FRENCH REVOLUTION 474 (1989)
("For the majority of deputies.. .Fauchet's millennial realm of love and brotherhood was just a
utopian balloon, moved by its rhetorical hot air to drift over the revolutionary landscape.").
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Crucially, the eclipse of fraternity, if not also of solidarity,65 did not
undermine the continuing dynamism of the other French revolutionary values
of liberty and equality. 66 Fraternity, and to a degree its close cognates such as
solidarity and community, seem to have thus slid into something of a generally
subordinate status. Focusing directly on the idea of community, the philos-
opher John Ladd, for example, has concluded that "the concept itself has been
regarded with suspicion. 67
Professor Ladd then goes on to argue that the idea of community--or on
our view, certainly, fraternity--occupies an awkward position. Ladd writes that
"the idea of community does not, at least nowadays, readily fit into the
established categories of ethical analysis, which.., are generally framed in
quasi-utilitarian terms of individual interests, rational choice, individual rights
and the ideals of political liberalism." 68
To the extent that homelessness is a problem of community, or the lack
thereof, we may find that homelessness inherits the awkward fit of the value of
community, solidarity and fraternity in a constitutional culture of individualism,
individual rational choice, and of individual rights. We may think of this as the
problem of fraternity's poor fit with, if not its near absence from, the United
States' constitutional framework. We pursue this constitutional marginalization
of fraternity below.69
We should be under no illusions as to the scope of the problem. The
problem of the constitutional status of homelessness does not become easily
resolvable merely by redirecting our attention to other grounds for objecting to
the failure to adequately address homelessness. Recall that we have referred to
the problem of homelessness in terms of a failure of empathy, 70 lack of social
64 One scholar marks the European revolutionary movements of 1848 as superseding the
idea of broad fraternity with that of group solidarity. See HAUKE BRUNKHORST, SOLIDARrITY:
FROM Civic FRIENDSHIPTO A GLOBALLEGALCOMMUNITY 1 (Jeffrey Flynn trans. 2005) (2002).
65 See id.
66 See SCHAMA, supra note 63, at 474-75 (eclipse of French revolutionary value of
fraternity did not impeach the value of equality). For a survey of the career of the idea of
liberty, see IsAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS
ON LIBERTY 166, 166-217 (Henry Hardy ed. 2002). For an argument that accepting the value of
equality need not be tied to accepting the related idea of solidarity, see Albert Weale, Equality,
Social Solidarity, and the Welfare State, 100 ETmcs 473, 477 (1990).67 John Ladd, The Idea of Community, an Ethical Exploration, Part I: The Search for an
Elusive Concept, 32 J. VALuE INQUIRY 5, 5 (1998).
6 id.
69 See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
70 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
4492007-2008]
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW [Vol.46
acknowledgment, 71 contempt,72 self-evident moral obligation, 73 urgent need,74
community 75 and the common good,76 social exclusion,77 flourishing and
perfectionism, 78 indignity and inviolable dignity,79 love of neighbor,80 and
solidarity8' as well as fraternity.82 It is fair to say that none of these themes and
values even minimally approaches centrality to the American constitutional
experience.
It is, however, the near absence of the value of fraternity from the American
constitutional scheme that is of special note. The value of fraternity seems
clearly inconsistent with a perennial social condition of chronic involuntary
homelessness on any substantial scale. And crucially, at least the abstract
possibility of constitutionally valuing fraternity, along with liberty and equality,
is suggested by the historic French example.83
But does the nearly complete absence of fraternity from the American
Constitution, originally or as amended, make any difference for homelessness
as a social and legal problem? Particular conceptions of both liberty and
equality, the first two elements of the French revolutionary triad, clearly
pervade the American Constitution. Our Constitution does not feature frater-
nity, but the Constitution does emphasize least certain forms of liberty and
equality. In the context of homelessness, might not some politically palatable
conceptions of liberty and equality suffice in fraternity's stead?
71 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
72 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
73 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
74 See supra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.75 See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
76 See id.
77 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
78 See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
79 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
80 See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
82 See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
83 See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text. For a rather more recent French
initiative on the problem of homelessness, see Kerstin Gehmlich, France Endorses Housing as a
Legal Right, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 4, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/world/articles/
2007/01104/franceendorseshousing-as-alegal-right/. The article in question reports then
presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy as vowing "that no homeless person would have to sleep
outside within two years of his taking office." Id. Official figures put the number of French
homeless as of 2001 at 86,500. Id.
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In a word, no. In the legal cases addressing the rights of the homeless,
themes of liberty84 and equality 5 recur, as we shall see,86 frequently. But the
various commonly asserted liberty and equality rights of the homeless, even if
legally recognized, would in most instances fall far short of any genuine
resolution of homelessness as a fundamental social and legal problem. 7
Liberty and equality do not make up for the absence of fraternity in the context
of homelessness.
Now, we can certainly think of liberty and equality in ways not confined to
the typical run of American homeless litigation issues and theories. We could
in theory adopt particular understandings of both liberty 88 and equality 89 that
would imply an enforceable right to housing, and an end to involuntary
homelessness.
But even so, the ideas of liberty and of equality, in our constitutional
tradition, are not well-suited to capturing and embodying any of the most
central rationales 90 comprising the basic moral critique of homelessness. Our
most familiar understandings of liberty and equality simply do not fit well with
the underlying concerns at stake in homelessness as a social and legal problem.
Let us briefly consider first the relation between liberty, or freedom, and
homelessness. Here, we have a powerful, acutely argued treatment by Profes-
sor Jeremy Waldron.91 With the substance of Professor Waldron's argument
we need take no issue. Our argument is merely that liberty, as typically
understood in our constitutional system, is less central to the problem of




88 Any enforceable legal rule guaranteeing a genuinely free choice between housing and no
housing would suffice.
89 An enforceable rule guaranteeing equally to all persons housing of at least some baseline
quality could count as an interpretation of the equality or equal dignity of persons.
90 See supra Part H.
91 Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLAL. REv. 295 (199 1).
For brief discussion of Professor Waldron on homelessness, see, for example, CHARLES FRIED,
MODERN LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT 80-81 (2007). Pursuing some of Waldron's
themes is Jane B. Baron, Homelessness as a Property Problem, 36 URB. L. 273,284 (2004) (or
realistically, a problem of "no property").
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homelessness than are the concepts we introduced above,92 some of which,
including the idea of dignity, Waldron himself emphasizes.93
Professor Waldron' s crucial argument in this respect, dramatically conden-
sed, is that our regime of property rights is contributing to "a state of affairs in
which a million or more citizens have no place to perform elementary human
activities like urinating, washing, sleeping, cooking, eating, and standing
around." 94 According to Professor Waldron's understanding, this state of
affairs amounts to a significant lack of freedom for those affected, in a
traditional "negative" sense of the term.95 As Waldron explains the usage, "a
person is free to be someplace just in case he is not legally liable to be
physically removed from the place or penalized for being there. At the very
least, negative freedom is freedom from obstructions such as someone else's
forceful effort to prevent one from doing something. 96 In this sense, then, the
homeless lack basic liberty.97
Still, lack of liberty itself is not central to what is most deeply objectionable
about homelessness, in contrast to some or all of the moral approaches to
homelessness referred to above. Liberty, or its absence, may be crucial to
understanding why there has arisen and remains a legal and social problem of
homelessness. But lack of liberty, precisely understood, is not central to the
basic moral objectionability of involuntary homelessness.
Professor Waldron rightly characterizes homelessness as involving what
amounts to a legally imposed prohibition on one's exercise of the most
inescapable, elemental functions.98 At an only slightly greater extreme, we
might imagine someone being denied oxygen to breathe based on their inability
to pay. The problem with a focus on liberty, however, is that liberty as a
concept is most at home in circumstances in which we can imagine more than
one at least minimally valued, or more than just one objectively valuable,
choice. Liberty thus comes into its own when we have realistically eligible
alternatives. Most of us, however, care little about having a choice between
92 See supra Part II.
93 See, e.g., Waldron's discussion of dignity, privacy, and degradation in Waldron, supra
note 91, at 320-24.
94 Id. at 301.
95 The classic distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' or developmental, self-
realizational liberty would be BERLIN, supra note 66, at 169-181.96 Waldron, supra note 91, at 304.
9' See id. at 304-05.98 See supra text accompanying note 94.
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being homeless and not being homeless. Just not being homeless, or just
having a home in this sense, is paramount.
Technically, we may be free to choose between starvation and sustenance;
suffocation and breathing; freezing to death and surviving; or slightly less
starkly, no shelter and shelter against the adverse elements. And we do not
deny that a reasonable person could find horrific shelter conditions to be even
less eligible than sleeping in a park. But in many instances, a choice between
homelessness and a home is, in the vernacular if not literally, said to be no real
choice at all. We care far less about the unconstrained freedom in choosing
than we do about not being homeless, even if having a home were legally
required. In contrast, when liberty is central, we are left socially unrestrained as
between at least two alternatives of at least some minimal choice-worthiness. 99
For most persons under most circumstances, freezing to death or
suffocating are not minimally valuable options; they are simply states of affairs
to be avoided. Abject homelessness, for most, is not an eligible lifestyle, as
might be something like working at home, traveling more, retiring, or starting a
business. Abject homelessness is not like the opportunity to vote for any of a
range of more and less appealing political candidates. For most, homelessness
is to be avoided, whether we are free to choose homelessness or not.
The massive difference in value, or between value and enormous dis-value,
that separates having a home from abject homelessness thus makes
homelessness less a matter of not having a genuine choice, and more a matter of
winding up with an intensely undesired outcome. The most direct and
substantive problem for such homeless persons is not their having no choice.
The choice, if given, would not be an interesting one. The basic moral problem
is not lack of liberty, but the commonly horrific character of homelessness as a
99 For discussion, see CHRISTINE SWANTON, FREEDOM: A COHERENCE THEORY 80, 162
(1992) (linking one's degree of freedom, all else equal, with the significance of one's available
options, with 'significance' understood in terms of the chooser's interests); MATTHEW H.
KRAMER, THE QUALITY OF FREEDOM 241-42 (2003) (distinguishing among the content-
independent value of one's freedom to do or not do some action X; the content-dependent value
of that freedom, and the sheer value of doing X). Kramer rightly recognizes that we sometimes
value our freedom to do something we would have no inclination to do, especially if our
freedom in that respect is a mark of public respect for our rationality and dignity as competent
persons. Id. at 241. See also IAN CARTER, A MEASURE OF FREEDOM 54 (1999) (recognizing that
what we see as valueless, undesirable, or otherwise ineligible alternatives may change, and may
itself reflect our freedoms or lack of freedoms in other respects); STANLEY I. BENN, A THEORY OF
FREEDOM 128 (1988) ("[I]t is incongruous to talk of unfreedom to do things that there could be
no point in doing.").
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way of living. Nor is our commonly strong preference for a home itself
typically unfreely arrived at, or a product of subtle coercion.
This is not to suggest that ordinarily, homelessness is freely chosen.' We
suggest merely that the generally overwhelming preferability of civilized
housing to homelessness should draw much of our attention away from
homelessness as a matter of an unfree choice, and toward the reasons why
homelessness would not ordinarily be considered as an eligible option among
others. Homelessness is, for various obvious reasons, typically a moral and
practical disaster. That homeless persons are also typically not free to choose
with respect to, say, eating or sleeping is normally secondary to the obvious,
freely recognized harms of simply being unable to eat or sleep.
It might be thought that this argument could imply that even chattel slavery,
because of its horrific quality and its unique undesirability, is only secondarily
about freedom. This analogy is instructive, but imperfect. Being enslaved
itself is horrific. A slave presumably wants, overwhelmingly, to just not be a
slave. But having a free choice between remaining a slave and no longer being
a slave probably is in itself often of greater dignitary value than being able to
freely choose between homelessness and having a home. Slavery as a formal
system typically tries to explicitly impeach the overall judgment, rationality,
maturity and the value of independent living to the slave. Exercising precisely
the choice to no longer be a slave may therefore be in itself of special dignitary
value.
By contrast, we assume that most involuntarily homeless persons wish not
liberty in the sense of a free choice between homelessness and a genuine home,
but primarily just having a home. Being homeless is often officially unnoticed,
and does not, in some sense, involve an explicit and invidious official
assessment. Being homeless is usually not so stark of an official, formal
impeachment of one's ability to value and utilize freedom as would be chattel
slavery. Options, choices, or alternatives, one of which involves a home, are
thus not of central concern for the homeless. Gaining a home is. Liberty or
freedom in the standard constitutional sense is thus not central to homelessness
in this regard. Freedom for the slave, and choosing to not be a slave, are thus
typically of some value as a rebuttal to an official formal assessment.
10o See the language in Franklin v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, 543 A.2d 1,
3 (N.J. 1988) (per curiam) ("Homelessness functions not as a freely chosen option but as a
tragic, inexorable destiny.") (citation omitted).
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As a partial test of this claim that standard conceptions of liberty tend not to
be central to the circumstances of the homeless, we can think of the actual case
law involving various asserted liberty rights of homeless persons. 10 1 At the risk
of oversimplifying, the liberty rights claims typically brought on behalf of the
homeless seem, however well intended, to be less than dramatically trans-
formative. °2 Typically, even a clear legal victory for homeless persons on
matters of individual liberty and choice, however welcome, would leave the
basic social experience of involuntary homelessness recognizably in place. One
explanation for this would be that neither liberty nor, as we shall now see,
equality, is as directly and as precisely central to the crucial moral harms of
homelessness as would be our largely missing third constitutional element, the
obligations of fraternity.
A parallel argument thus may be made that familiar conceptions of equality
and inequality are also typically not central to what is most deeply objectionable
about homelessness. Again, there is much to be said about, say, the obviously
important inequalities between abjectly homeless and comfortably housed
persons. Our point again is that what is most crucial, and most morally
disturbing, about homelessness is not precisely a matter of inequalities among
persons or circumstances.
Of course, the idea of inequalities inescapably attend our thinking about
homelessness. Classically, for example, the French writer Anatole France
observed ironically that the homeless "must labour in the face of the majestic
equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges,
to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread."'1 3 And our thinking about certain
basic inequalities may well lead us to think about the problem of homelessness.
As a prominent example of the latter, consider the constitutional history
and theory presented by Akhil Amar.104 According to Professor Amar's view,
the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude,'0 5
101 See infra Part IV. The case of a freedom to beg or not beg for one's bare survival or
sustenance may be a closer case. But even with regard to such begging, we can imagine that
what typically matters most to a desperate beggar is the actual (successful) begging, or the
exercised right or opportunity to beg, and not the freedom to beg or not for one's survival. For
some relevant discussion, see Stephen R. Munzer, Ellickson on "Chronic Misconduct" in Urban
Spaces, 32 HARV. C.R.-C .L. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1997).
102 See infra Part IV.
103 ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LLY 91 (Winifred Stephens trans. 1923) (1894).
104 For our purposes, see Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican Theory
of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37 (1990).
105 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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as enforceable by Congress, 1°6 has broad implications, and involves a broad
public commitment. In particular, the Thirteenth Amendment is thought not to
tolerate the perpetuation of "a degraded caste of people."'10 7 Affirmatively,
there is said to arise "a right to sustenance and shelter: minimum sustenance,
minimum shelter."'10 8
Professor Amar explicitly emphasizes, however, that a right to a minimum
floor level of some entitlement generally does not require equality in the
distribution of that entitlement. 1 9 With respect to homelessness, we should
similarly appreciate the difference between something like adequate or
minimally decent housing on the one hand, and housing that is substantively
equal among persons on the other.
Whatever its various complications, 110 equality and inequality is essentially
a matter of comparisons, or of relative shares or distributions."' A homeless
person who gains access to adequate housing may or may not thereby acquire
housing that is equal in quality or quantity to anyone else's. Solving the
problem of homelessness through universal access to adequate housing would
imply little beyond that about substantive equality or inequality in housing.11 2
Of course, the idea of equality in one form or another would attend any real
solution to the problem of homelessness. After all, any one adequate home is
equally within the category of adequate homes as any other adequate home.
Persons with homes equally have homes. More deeply, we might want to
provide an adequate home to a homeless person because he or she is equal to
the rest of us in some quality like dignity, humanity, vulnerability, or need.' 13
106Id. § 2.
107 Amar, supra note 104, at 39.
108 Id.'9Id. at41.
i10 For a number of such complications, see DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALrrIES (1983);
AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992); LARRY S. TEMKIN, INEQUALITY (1993).
111 See, e.g., TEMKIN, supra note 110, at 8, 246. Arguably, the Supreme Court has
misunderstood the comparative essence of equality in holding that some minimally sufficient
education qualifies as equal protection in education. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973) (citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972)) (a case
concerning housing).
112 More broadly, consider the distinctions drawn more generally between, say, the
sufficiency of one's resources and the equality of one's resources, in the collection, Should
Differences in Income and Wealth Matter?, 19 SOCIAL PHIL. & POL'Y 1 (2002) or in book form
as SHOULD DIFFERENCES IN INCOME AND WEALTH MATTER? (Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller
& Jeffrey Paul eds. Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
113 See the more basic and direct rationales discussed supra Part IH.
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One limitation of the value of this focus on equality in this sense, however, is
that equality then becomes trivially the justification of every sound public
policy in every area. We should not, for example, punish a given individual
cruelly and unusually because of that individual's equal dignity or equal
capacity for suffering along with all those of us who do not deserve such
treatment. In such a case, and in that of homelessness, it is not equality that is
doing the crucial work, but one or more of the deeper and more direct moral
concerns referred to above." 14
In general, then, the broad constitutional ideas of liberty and equality are
certainly associated with the problem of homelessness, but are not of the moral
essence of the problem in the way that fraternity, the third element of the
French revolutionary triad, more directly is. The fact that our Constitution
recognizes explicitly some forms of liberty' 15 and equality, " 6 but not fraternity
or solidarity," 17 thus contributes to a deep explanation of the long-term fate of
the homeless under the Constitution.
114 See id. This is not to deny that there are some contexts in which treating someone
adequately requires treating the person equally, as in various sorts of purely competitive
contexts, including contests, academic tests, or sports events. On the other hand, we can
imagine, however unrealistically, a housing subsidy solution to the problem of homelessness
that increased the value of the average home by an amount greater than the subsidy given to
homeless persons, in this sense increasing inequality.
115 We may tend to think first of the provisions of the First Amendment when we think of
constitutional liberty, but a number of provisions not only of the Bill of Rights more broadly,
but of even the unamended text of the Constitution promote liberty of persons and groups in
various respects. For broad discussion, see, respectively, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BELL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005).116 Here, the Reconstruction Amendments, and the Fourteenth Amendment in particular
would occur to us first, but again, as with liberty, the idea of equality in one respect or another
recurs throughout the amended and unamended Constitution.
117 One could argue for fraternalist or solidaristic elements of several constitutional
provisions, but only in some secondary, attenuated sense. Under the Commerce Clause, for
example, there is a sense of a barrier-free, unified national market that should resist
discrimination against out of staters and certain disfavored classes. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526
U.S. 489 (1999) (privileges and immunities non-discrimination in welfare benefits); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978)
(regarding importation of out-of-state waste for disposal); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (non-discrimination
on racial grounds under 1964 Civil Rights Act Public Accommodations Title 11). There is in all
this no rich, classic, deep sense of fraternity or solidarity, certainly to the degree that liberty and
equality arise in these and similar contexts.
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It might well be argued that constitutional indifference to the problem of
homelessness is a function not of the missing, third, fraternal element of the
Constitution, but instead of the fact that our Constitution has been held to be a
bulwark, primarily, of "negative" as distinct from "positive" rights."
18
Homelessness would on this view be a problem of an unsurprisingly unfulfilled"positive" constitutional right claim.
We need not deny that generally, though not entirely, 19 the Constitution
has been interpreted to accord "negative" rights against governmental interfere-
ence, rather than "positive" rights to affirmative, costly government provision
of valuable resources.1 20 And if so, this doctrinal fact would certainly bear
upon our constitutional treatment of homelessness.
But one might then still ask why our Constitution, including its potentially
rich and adaptable notions of liberty and equality, has been consistently inter-
preted to accord negative rather than positive rights, including any possible
positive right to any minimal sort of physical shelter.' 2' And this question
doubtless has a complex answer. But one important element of such an answer
would draw upon precisely our historical lack of any substantial constitution-
alist sense of fraternity, solidarity, or of a universal and binding commitment to
each of our fellows against basic adversities.
118 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1989)
(no constitutional right to positive, expensive, affirmative provision of governmental assistance
even in practically vital circumstances of threat by private actors not implicating state
responsibility); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005). For discussion, see
David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. Cln. L. REv. 864 (1986).
119 Probably the best-recognized federal constitutional right of a materially redistributive or
costly nature is the right to free criminal counsel in serious cases for indigent defendants. See
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
120 We assume this strict dichotomy between negative and positive rights only for the sake
of the discussion. There may well be a continuum involved, borderline cases, or even mutual
reclassifiability as between negative and positive rights. For brief discussion, see Archie v. City
of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1221-22 (7th Cir. 1988).
121 In Lindsey v. Normet, the Court, arguably in dicta, referred not to minimal or adequate
shelter, but to shelter of an unspecified particular quality, and denied the existence of any such
constitutional right. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972) ("We do not denigrate
the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide
judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document
any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality .... "). For a
responsive strategy emphasizing the role of economic and social human rights advocacy, see
Maria Foscarinas, Advocating for the Human Right to Housing: Notes from the United States,
30 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 447,447-48 (2006); Roisman, supra note 5.
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On this approach, the general absence of positive constitutional rights
would be partly explained by our missing constitutional triadic element, that of
fraternity or solidarity. Of course, historically, the United States has hardly
been without important institutions and movements rich in one sense or another
of fraternity, group solidarity, charity, community, and even the pursuit of the
common good. 122 But these cultural elements have rarely percolated into
positive basic federal constitutional law.
It is worth mentioning that the single most prominent example of a
recognizably positive constitutional right, the right to free criminal defense
counsel in serious cases,123 is mainly a matter of minimum adversarial fairness,
as opposed to any explicit recognition of an underlying value of fraternity, or of
our underlying bondedness with indigent defendants. This leaves open, then,
the possibility that the general absence of positive constitutional rights,
especially with regard to housing, reflects the general absence of the idea of
fraternity at the federal constitutional level. 124
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL HOMELESSNESS LITIGATION IN THE ABSENCE OF
FRATERNITY
In the general absence of anything like fraternity or solidarity at the
constitutional level, constitutional litigation on behalf of the homeless must take
other tacks. Pursuing a theme introduced above, 125 we could say that in the
absence of constitutional fraternity, rights-claims under the rubrics of liberty
and equality remain. We have already seen, however, that carefully under-
stood, neither liberty nor equality is central to the essence of homelessness. 126
The constitutional absence of fraternity and the mismatch of liberty and
equality with the problem of homelessness jointly contribute to a common
reaction of disappointment in the constitutional homelessness cases.
Disappointment here is not primarily a matter of preferring that the homeless
122 See, e.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Gerald Bevan trans.
Penguin Books 2003) (1835 & 1840); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 93-133 (2000);
AMITAI ETzIONI, THE SPIRTrr OF COMMuNITY: THE REINVENTION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 116-34
(1993); ARTHUR C. BROOKS, WHO REALLY CARES: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT
COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM (2006).123 See supra note 119.
124 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. Whether a deep explanation of our
constitutional commitment to minimum adversarial fairness must at some point eventually draw
upon the idea of fraternity, apart from equality, is a question we need not herein explore.
125 See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 91-114 and accompanying text.
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party had prevailed where they did not. Rather, the disappointment is more a
sense that even if the homeless party had prevailed--or now that the homeless
party has indeed prevailed-the fundamental nature and scope of involuntary
homelessness as a social and moral problem would remain insufficiently
addressed.
This is of course not to criticize the legal advocates for the homeless or
their strategies. Those advocates operate within the constraints of the inter-
preted Constitution, including what is missing as well as what is present. Their
incentives are mainly to litigate, at a constitutional level, claims on which they
have at least some chance of prevailing. Advocates on behalf of the homeless
have, as we shall see, 127 displayed great and responsible creativity in bringing a
wide range of constitutional claims on behalf of the homeless, in a wide variety
of circumstances. 128
Several of the more common types of constitutional claims, based ulti-
mately on liberty or equality, are illustrated below. 129 But the theme of the
typically limited significance of either victory or defeat in constitutional home-
lessness cases can just as well be introduced by considering a particular case
involving the homeless, but not directly involving any rights, crucial or trivial,
of the homeless themselves.
This case, Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church v. City of New York,13"
involved a claim by the Church that, pursuant to section 1983, New York City
violated their free exercise of religion. 131 The Church argued successfully that
their efforts to carry out their religious mandate "to care for the least, the lost,
and the lonely of this world"'132 fell within the scope of ministry protected by
the Free Exercise Clause. 133 The City's argument had been that the Church's
127 See infra Part IV.
128 Many, if not all, of these claims, on various constitutional theories, partake of either
liberty or equality. See id. But if someone wants to conclude that some constitutional
arguments on behalf of the homeless have only a tenuous connection to liberty and equality, we
need not raise any serious objection.29 See infra Part IV.
130 293 F.3d 570 (2d Cir. 2002).
131 Id. at 575.
131 Id. at 574-75.
133 See id. at 575-76 (likelihood of prevailing on the merits standard for a preliminary
injunction against the City).
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activity in this case did not amount to a "meaningful provision of 'services ' ' 34
and therefore did not constitute protected religious conduct. 135
Whatever the broader mission and ministry of the Church toward the
homeless, however, in this case, the only activity involved was the Church's
allowing homeless persons to sleep outdoors, unprotected by shelter from the
elements, on Church property, during the month of February in New York
City. 136 In a sense we can easily understand the City's ordinary police power
concern for this "outdoor sanctuary"'137 program. It seems easy enough to
characterize the Church's practice, by itself, as "providing inadequate
shelter" 138 as opposed to some assumed "safer, more civilized alternative,"' 139 as
the City argued.
But from the standpoint of many of the homeless, a legal victory in this
case for either the Church or the City would have left them in fundamentally
unchanged circumstances. If the City's own, or any private shelter system had
been generally thought to be better, overall, than sleeping outdoors on Church
property on a February night, presumably most involuntarily homeless persons
could have been so persuaded."4° Of course, mental illness or impaired
decisionmaking may take its toll in such cases. 14 1 But some homeless persons
'34 Id. at 574.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 572.
137 Id. at 574.
138 Id. at 576.
139 Id.
140 See id.
141 See, e.g., Jones v. City of L.A., 444 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Institute for
the Study of Homelessness and Poverty report finding mental illness in one-third to one-half of
Los Angeles homeless persons); NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, WHY ARE PEOPLE
HOMELESS? 6 (June, 2007), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/facts/Why.pdf
("Approximately 16% of the single adult homeless population suffers from some form of severe
and persistent mental illness."); Hemmy So, Homeless Families Find Little Shelter, Study Says,
L.A. TMES, May 20, 2006, 2006 WLNR 8674655 (finding that "[o]ne-third of the [homeless]
heads of household experienced substance abuse, mental illness or both"). This is not to
establish the role of mental illness in causing or in the solution to the problem of homelessness.
See Florence Wagman Roisman, The Lawyer as Abolitionist: Ending Homelessness and Poverty
in Our Time, 19 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 237,246-47 (2000) (affordable subsidized housing
as the most effective response to homelessness even among mentally ill persons). Nor is this to
deny the value of more effective mental health treatment for homeless persons. See, e.g.,
ECONOMIC ROUNDTABLE & INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF HOMELESSNESS AND POvERTY AT THE
WEINGART CENTER, 10-YEAR STRATEGY TO END HOMELESSNESS: PUBLIC DISCUSSION DRAFr 15
(June 11, 2004), http://www.bringlahome.org/docs/Strategy-toEnd-Homelessness.pdf.
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may reject the realistically available shelter alternatives based on under-
standable grounds, 42 even where such alternatives exist. 143
We can in any event say that whoever prevails in this and similar cases, the
practical circumstances of the homeless remain fundamentally the same. In this
case, homeless persons, admittedly, did not even comprise a litigating party.
But we should be under no illusions. Where homeless persons are the principal
parties, constitutional litigation of all sorts, civil and criminal, whether as
plaintiff or as defendants, and whether won, lost, or settled, tends to be of little
consequence for the crucial underlying respects in which responsible persons
would care about homelessness.
This is again not to minimize the achievements of legal advocates for the
homeless. Those advocates appreciate keenly the constraints their constitu-
tional litigation typically faces. We mean simply to illustrate the realistic
impact of the general absence of a constitutional sense of fraternity or
solidarity, along with the awkward fit of the concepts of liberty and equality
with the basic problem of homelessness.
Constitutional litigation on behalf of the homeless has taken up a number of
themes, individually and in combination. A partial listing could include the
following: a right to travel, interstate or intrastate, or to not travel; freedom of
142 See, e.g., the sources cited supra note 13; Jane B. Baron, Homelessness as a Property
Problem, 36 URB. L. 273, 278 (2004) ("Given the mean reality of shelter life, a rational person
could sensibly choose the alternative difficulties of surviving in public spaces.").143 Indoor shelter, no matter how categorically preferred officially, may simply not be
realistically available or affordable for many homeless persons. See, e.g., So, supra note 141
("Less than a quarter of homeless families in Los Angeles County can find beds at emergency
shelters on any given night."). See also Jones v. City of L.A., 444 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir.
2006) ("For the approximately 11,000-12,000 homeless individuals in Skid Row, space is
available in SRO hotels, shelters, and other temporary or transitional housing for only 9,000 to
10,000, leaving more than 1,000 people unable to find shelter each night. In the County as a
whole, there are almost 50,000 more homeless people than available beds.") (citations omitted).
144See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 15-83 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
("[A]rresting the homeless for the harmless acts which they are forced to perform in public
infringes on their fundamental right to travel."); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 402,423
(1995) (local prohibition on 'camping' or storing possessions on public streets or parks as not
violative of any protected right to travel). See also Betancourt v. Bloomberg, 448 F.3d 547,
554, 555 n.** (2d Cir. 2006) (Calabresi, J. dissenting). For discussion, see Paul Ades,
Comment, The Unconstitutionality of 'Antihomeless' Law: Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in
Outdoor Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 CAL. L. REV. 595, 609-13
(1989) (discussing lower court opinions extending interstate to intrastate travel rights); Nan S.
Ellis & Cheryl M. Miller, Welfare Waiting Periods: A Public Policy Analysis ofSaenz v. Roe,
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speech claims and related overbreadth claims; 45 privacy and unreasonable
search and seizure claims and defenses;146 state constitutional unenumerated
rights and substantive due process claims; 47 cruel and unusual punishment
claims and defenses;148 the possible applicability of a "necessity" defense to
11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 343, 349-51 (2000) (skeptical of any need for durational residency
requirements given disparities among states in welfare benefit provision).
145 See, e.g., Clark v. Community For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298-99
(1984) (upholding park regulation prohibiting a "tent city" protest against homelessness as a
supposedly content-neutral regulation of symbolic speech); Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899,
905-09 (7th Cir. 2000) (regulation of public street begging and prohibition of "aggressive
panhandling" upheld as supposedly content-neutral restriction of speech and as not
unconstitutionally vague); Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699,704-05 (2d Cir.
1993) (distinguishing subway begging case and enjoining enforcement of broad prohibition of
public loitering for purposes of begging; noting that "[b]egging frequently is accompanied by
speech indicating the need for.., shelter .... ); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242,
1264 (3d Cir. 1992) (library rules against offensive hygiene/nuisance upheld under free speech
challenge as narrowly tailored to serve significant government interests while leaving available
ample alternative channels of communication); Armstrong v. D.C. Public Library, 154 F. Supp.
2d 67, 77-79 (D.D.C. 2001) (free speech right-to-receive information violated by library's
denial of access based on subjective "objectionable appearance" standard as opposed to more
objective "nuisance" test) (regulation held vague and overbroad); People v. Griswold, 821
N.Y.S.2d 394, 402 (2006) (trial court holding City's anti-aggressive panhandling rule
unconstitutional on first amendment grounds when applied to defendant "merely standing on the
sidewalk, passively and silently, holding a handwritten sign that said simply, 'Homeless.
Hungry. Please Help'); Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d
1022, 1032 (9th Cir. 2006) (non-commercial food distribution to poor homeless in public spaces
may or may not amount to protected speech or expression under an as-applied challenge).
146 See, e.g., Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1572-74 (finding certain seizures of homeless
persons' personal property to have been unlawful, but also finding, on a sort of inescapably
mechanical logic, no privacy rights violation, as "where plaintiffs are in the unfortunate position
of having to perform certain life-sustaining activities in public, this court has difficulty finding
that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those activities"). Thus, the more
desperate and abject one's circumstances, the fewer one's privacy rights. The early stage
litigation was also discussed in the property seizure and destruction case of Kincaid v. City of
Fresno, No. 1:06-CV-1445 OWW SMS, 2007 WL 833058 (E.D. Cal. March 19, 2007).
147 See, e.g., Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742, 750 (1995) (finding, under several state
constitutional provisions, "no governmental obligation to provide minimal subsistence... to the
poor"). For critique, see Andrew J. Liese, Note, We Can Do Better: Anti-Homelessness
Ordinances as Violations of State Substantive Due Process Law, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1413
(2006).148 See, e.g., Tobe, 892 P.2d at 1166 (focusing on question of controllability or
involuntariness of the status); Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1361-62 (1lth Cir. 2000)
(no violation of Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause prohibition against
punishing defendant's status, as opposed to defendant's conduct, as no involuntary behavior was
criminalized where shelter space had always been available and no one had been turned away
from the shelter); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1565 ("[A]s the homeless plaintiffs do not have a
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certain criminal charges; 149 equal protection claims;' 50 as well as procedural due
process and vagueness' 5 1 claims and defenses.
single place where they can lawfully be, the challenged ordinances, as applied to them,
effectively punish them for something for which they may not be convicted under the Eighth
Amendment-sleeping, eating, and other innocent conduct"); Jones, 444 F.3d at 1128-29,
1128,1138 (no shelter space available suggests a 'status' rather than 'conduct' classification;
cruel and unusual punishment claim may be based upon operation of the criminal process well
before any actual criminal conviction); Benson v. City of Chi., No. 06 C 1123, 2006 WL
2949521, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2006) (distinguishing Jones as the ordinance in Benson
required that the defendant leave the real property of another when notified to do so, leaving
open the possibility of not being similarly notified to leave after the homeless person has been
required to move elsewhere, once or on multiple occasions); Johnson v. City of Dallas, 61 F.3d
442, 444-45 (5th Cir. 1995) (homeless persons not yet convicted under public sleeping
ordinance lack standing to bring Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment claim);
D'Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877,879 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1995) (cruel and unusual punishment
clause protects only convicted persons). For commentary, see, for example, Benno Weisberg,
When Punishing Innocent Conduct Violates the Eighth Amendment: Applying the Robinson
Doctrine to Homelessness and Other Contextual "Crimes, " 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 329,
330-31 (2005) (seeking to focus not on status versus conduct, an often realistically meaningless
distinction, but between innocent conduct and culpable conduct, which may also be
controversial); Donald E. Baker, "Anti-Homeless" Legislation: Unconstitutional Efforts to
Punish the Homeless, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 417 (1991). Our broader point is that litigation that
succeeds in avoiding the criminalization of involuntary homelessness, however appreciated,
leaves the most basic moral and social realities essentially unchanged.
149 See, e.g., Jones, 444 F.3d at 1130-31 ("A criminal defendant may assert a necessity
defense if he has committed an offense to prevent an imminent harm that he could not otherwise
have prevented."); see also Antonia K. Fasanelli, Note, In re Eichorn: The Long Awaited
Implementation of the Necessity Defense in a Case of the Criminalization of Homelessness, 50
AM. U.L. REv. 323 (2000). More generally, see R. GEORGE WRIGHT, DoEs THE LAW MORALLY
BIND THE POOR?: OR WHAT GOOD'S THE CONSTITUTION WHEN You CAN'T BUY A LOAF OF
BREAD? 102-74 (1996) ("Desperation and Necessity: Les Miserables On Trial").
From our perspective, the necessity defense doctrine presents two major problems. First,
the requirement that the homeless defendant not have significantly contributed to his or her own
exposure to the elements may sometimes be met, but in others, essentially similar cases, will not.
Sometimes, a homeless person may literally miss the last bus, for one reason or another. To
convict some homeless persons, but not other homeless persons essentially similarly situated,
may be doctrinally sound, but in the broader scheme of things seems to involve a breach of the
constitutionally missing value of fraternity or solidarity. And again, even successfully invoking
the necessity defense to various charged crimes does not fundamentally address the basic moral
status of involuntary homelessness and of homeless persons.
150 See, e.g., Joel, 232 F.3d at 1357-59 ("Homeless persons are not a suspect class, nor is
sleeping out-of-doors a fundamental right.") (citing D'Aguanno, 50 F.3d at 879 n.2); id. at
1358-59 (mere disparate impact on homeless persons evokes only minimum equal protection
scrutiny; ordinance in question held to "promote aesthetics, sanitation, public health, and
safety"); Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1269 n.36 (to similar effect); Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1578-79
(no grounds for equal protection heightened scrutiny or any fundamental rights claim). For
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As well appreciated as all of this litigation deserves to be, the stark limit-
ations of this litigation even at its most successful are plain. 152 Universal access
to shelter from the elements, whether in public, subsidized private, or even
religiously-affiliated facilities, is rarely in direct issue. The health, safety, or
privacy of indoor shelters is for one reason or another similarly left on the back
burner. Instead, courts divide over whether restrictions on various forms of
speech by homeless persons should count as content-based or content-neutral,
typically without serious argument for either result. 153 The privacy expectations
of persons who must perform virtually all bodily activities in public are
debated. 54 Whether the elemental activities of homeless persons should count
as manifestations of a status, or as conduct, is debated.155  Whether the
critical discussion, see Jennifer E. Watson, When No Place is Home: Why the Homeless Deserve
Suspect Classification, 88 IOWA L. REv. 501 (2003). Again, much of the standard equal
protection focus, in the absence of a concern for fraternity and solidarity, vaguely misses the
mark in addressing homelessness. Equality itself is hardly the basic concern, in any substantive
sense. Involuntarily homeless persons are typically not immutably homeless. Often, nothing
about them contributing to their homelessness is immutable. And the idea that typical
involuntarily homeless persons would want to assert a fundamental right to be chronically
without shelter free of criminal prosecution, as opposed to simply gaining access to minimal
shelter, is simply unrealistic.
151 See Pottinger, 810 F. Supp. at 1575; Joel, 232 F.3d at 1359-60 ("Joel's facial
challenge.., on vagueness grounds must necessarily fail because his conduct was clearly within
the scope of the ordinance's prohibition against sleeping out-of-doors on public property.")
(rejecting as-applied challenge as well); Betancourt, 448 F.3d at 553 ("An ordinary person
would understand that an agglomeration of boxes large enough for a man to fit into would be
,something that obstructs or impedes."').
152 See Jane B. Baron, Homelessness As a Property Problem, 36 URB. L. 273,273 (2004)
(noting the irony of constitutional litigation aimed essentially at allowing the homeless a
somewhat greater permitted range of activities while remaining homeless). It is certainly
possible to argue that winning a right to be somewhat more visible or more conspicuous to the
broader citizenry will expedite the eventual abolition of involuntary homelessness. Whether
such incremental legal victories might also provoke hostility, or policies that simply increase the
invisibility of the homeless, or that have no significant effect, is presumably an empirical
question. In any event, to see a homeless person as in this respect analogous to the sort of
"broken window" or untended graffiti that bespeaks a breakdown in social control is perverse.
A homeless person is a dignified person first, and a supposed symbol of anything second. For a
sense of the stark limits of a compromise or modus vivendi between the homeless and public
authorities, see, e.g., the district court's idea of two local "safe zones" where homeless persons
could be free from arrest for harmless activities in Pottinger v. City of Miami, 40 F.3d 1155,
1156 (11th Cir. 1994).
153 See the cases cited supra note 145.
154 See the cases cited supra note 146.
155 See the cases cited supra note 148.
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homeless person has meaningfully contributed at some point to her own
desperation is scrutinized.'56
Somewhat more broadly put, the emphasis in litigation tends to be on
whether homelessness itself, or the basic activities associated with homeless-
ness, can be criminalized, and if so, on what procedural terms and conditions. 157
From the standpoint of the basic objectionability of widespread involuntary
homelessness, these legal stakes seem unduly modest. Legal victories of this
sort won by the homeless seem tangential to the overall scheme of things. This
state of affairs, however, is less surprising when we remember the general
absence of any sort of fraternalist element, universal in scope, to complement
the Constitution's less relevant references to liberty and equality.
V. CONCLUSION: SOME STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS AND THE CONTINUING
NEED FOR FRATERNITY
We do not mean to suggest that homelessness on a large scale is entirely a
matter of the constitutional absence of fraternity or solidarity, or a general
antipathy for redistributive "positive" rights. We should instead acknowledge
some of the complications that would await any meaningful public or private
attack on the problem of homelessness.
Even a brief survey reveals some serious complications. Homelessness has
a range of causes, 158 some more important than others.159 Homelessness has a
range of victims, including families; the old and the very young; and workers
and those variously unable to work. 6° No solution to homelessness that does
not accommodate these basic complications can be viable.
The structure of housing markets also differs dramatically from that of the
markets for other vital necessities, including the consumer markets for food and
156 See the cases cited supra note 149.
157 See supra notes 148-51. See also NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, A DREAM
DENIED: THE CRIMINAuZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 16-18 (2006),
http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/crimreport/report.pdf (listing anti-panhandling
ordinances; anti-camping or anti-sleeping measures; anti-loitering measures; sweeps; curfews;
and restrictions on food distribution to homeless persons).
158 See, e.g., NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS, supra note 141.
159 See Roisman, supra note 141, at 246-47 (emphasizing the importance of subsidized
housing). More generally, see Roisman, supra note 5.
160 See, e.g., NATIONAL COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS supra note 141; ECONOMIC
ROUNDTABLE & INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF HOMELESSNESS AND POVERTY AT THE WEINGART
CENTER, supra note 141.
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even for basic health care. Housing is, relatively, non-divisible. It is supplied
typically in substantial, more or less predetermined "chunks." Adjusting one's
personal demand for housing over the short term can be possible. But such
adjustments, in light of changing financial circumstances, are typically not
smoothly continuous or themselves costless. As Jonathan Kozol has observed,
by contrast with housing, "one can rapidly and drastically adjust one's food
consumption."'] 61 Or more dramatically, being unable to afford to buy food on
one day typically does not raise the cost of buying food the next day. But
consider the transaction costs, and the possible loss of credit standing, associ-
ated with eviction or otherwise losing one's residence. If we then include the
possible additional costs of deposits with lessors or utilities, "[t]he cost of
losing housing and then paying for re-entry into the housing system.., is very
high....' 6 2
More generally, rising housing market and other land use values may be a
financial benefit to some, while creating increased difficulties for those with the
least income to devote to housing.163 Our federal system' 64 means that what-
ever in this regard the federal government cannot efficiently do, or chooses not
to undertake, is left to the states, to smaller governmental units, and to the
private and charitable sector. 165
Certain problems exist at the federal level, but seem even more intractable
at other levels. There are thus inherent advantages and disadvantages to both
161 JONATHAN KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN: HOMELESS FAMILIES IN AMERICA 13
(1988).162 id.
163 For discussion, see Editorial, Finding a Way Home: Our City, Our Duty, L.A. TIMES, 4
Mar. 5, 2006, at M4.164 For discussion, see, for example, Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the
Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484 (1987).165 Problems and possibilities related to a preference for federalism and localism, including
private initiatives, are sometimes discussed under the doctrinal rubric of 'subsidiarity.' See,
e.g., Francis J. Schweigert, Solidarity and Subsidiarity: Complementary Principles of Commu-
nity Development, 33 J. SocIAL PHL. 33 (2002); Neil MacCormick, Democracy, Subsidiarity,
and Citizenship in the "European Commonwealth," 16 LAW. & PHiL. 331 (1997). The idea of
subsidiarity itself implies that the lower levels of community may in certain contexts be
incapable for various reasons of promoting the development of their members. See Joseph P.
Rompala, Note, "Once More Unto the Breach, Dear Friends": Recurring Themes in Welfare
Reform in the United States and Great Britain and What the Principle of Subsidiarity Can Do
to Break the Pattern, 29 J. LEGIS. 307, 331-32 (2003). For a compilation of private sector;
public-private; and local, state, and federally-focused homelessness initiatives, see Interagency
Council on Homelessness, Innovative Initiatives (2005),
http://www.ich.gov/innovations/index.html.
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concentrating' 66 and dispersing167 homeless facilities and services, but the
familiar "not in my backyard" local resistance syndrome may attend both.168 As
well, private charitable action may be underfunded, unsystematic or less than
universal in scope, and hit or miss in application.' 69 But even governmental
state and local poor relief tends to be both limited and parochial in the sense of
seeking to provide fewer benefits to "outsiders" as opposed to "home-grown"
charitable cases. 170
What may seem like sheer parochialism or arbitrary exclusion of outsiders
may also reflect a strategic desire on the part of neighboring communities to
avoid making their own local expenditures on the homeless, and specifically to
"free ride" or to externalize and export those costs onto otherjurisdictions. It is
reported that in Los Angeles County, for example, "only 25 of 88
cities... spend money on housing and services for the homeless."' 7' In the
absence of meaningful requirements imposed from above, local cities may face
strong incentives to ride free on the presumed efforts of others. The tendencies
toward undersupply of homeless services follow inescapably. And even within
a narrow political jurisdiction, particular institutions and agencies may face
166 See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 1075, 1115-18 (2005)
("[A] homeless campus is a classic 'LULU' (locally undesirable land use)" provoking
NIMBYist or "not in my backyard" local reactions.).
167 Cara Mia DiMassa, L.A. County OKs 'Historic' Homeless Plan, L.A. TIMES, April 5,
2006, at Al (proposal to de-concentrate homeless services into five centers across the county).
168 See supra notes 166-67. For further discussion of the NIMBY syndrome in an
unrelated context, see Michael E. Kraft & Bruce B. Clary, Citizen Participation and the NIMBY
Syndrome: Public Response to Radioactive Waste Disposal, 44 W. POL. Q. 299 (1991).169 For a concrete sense of the occasional myopia, arbitrariness, and less than universal
sweep of even well-intended private charity, consider the several benefactors depicted in
CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (Penguin Books ed. 1996) (1853). For a more theoretical
discussion from a Dickens contemporary, see JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLICAL
ECONOMY, book V, ch. 11, at 43-48 (Longmans, Green 7th ed. 1909) (1848).
170 See William P. Quigley, Backwards into the Future: How Welfare Changes in the
Millenium Resemble English Poor Law of the Middle Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 101, 101
(1998). For the major constitutional cases, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (one
year durational residence requirement); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (limiting benefits to
those available in applicants' former state of residence).
... Gary Blasi et al., 5 Steps to Get Out of Skid Row, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006, at M4,
2006 WLNR 22749649. For some general background, see, for example, Richard J. Arneson,
The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems, 92 ETmCS 616 (1982).
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incentives to physically "dump" homeless persons elsewhere, if not outside the
local political jurisdiction. 72
Funding services for homeless persons must in addition survive the battle
against competing and more politically potent demands for public funds. 173
Attempting to narrow the class of those compelled to directly support homeless
services may only enhance the intensity of the lobbying and interest group
problems involved. 74 Almost by definition, the homeless themselves are
poorly placed to dispense meaningful rewards or punishments within the
electoral and political systems at any level. 175
An important implication of these structural problems is that an effective
and equitable solution to the problem must be not only jurisdictionally broad,
but genuinely fraternal, solidaristic, and universal in its scope. Imagine a local
jurisdiction that is contemplating an attempt to raise local funds to resolve the
local problem of homelessness in its current scope and magnitude. The effort
might well be abandoned under the combined threats of NIMBYism; 176
resistance, if not jurisdictional flight, by any distinctive sources of tax
funding; 177 and fear of exploitation and free-riding by other jurisdictions. 178
Homeless persons elsewhere can respond to incentives. By a sort of looseanalogy to the phenomena of moral hazard 179 and adverse selection,8 0 the
172 See, e.g., Randal C. Archbold, Bill Takes on "Dumping' of Homeless by Hospitals,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, at A12. ("Advocates for the homeless said it was common in many
cities for homeless people still requiring medical treatment to end up on the street or at the doors
of shelters ill prepared for their medical needs.").
173 See Ken Kusmer, Homeless Funding Falls in Indiana, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 23,
2007.
174 See id.
175 This is not to suggest that homeless persons or the poor in general have been recognized
as an equal protection class triggering any heightened judicial scrutiny of adverse legislation.
See generally Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
176 See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
177 See supra note 163. Note also the parallel fears, state rivalries, and incentives resolved
by an overarching federal statute in the state unemployment compensation tax case of Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
178 See id.
179For definitions, see A Dictionary of Economics, Oxford Reference Online,
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2006); A Dictionary
of Business and Management, Oxford Reference Online,
available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
180 For definitions, see the sources cited supra note 179. For discussion in a somewhat
different context, see, for example, MARK V. PAULY, ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD:
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS (2006),
2007-20081
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availability in a given location of dignified, humane, and fraternal treatment for
the homeless might attract homeless persons from other jurisdictions.181 This
could conceivably further raise costs to our hypothetical relatively fraternal
jurisdiction, and perhaps reduce costs elsewhere. Hence the need for a more
broadly jurisdictionally based fraternalism. The broader and more inclusive the
scope of the jurisdictions participating, 182 the lower the likelihood that potential
solutions to the problem of homelessness will be inadvertently sabotaged by
phenomena such as self-seeking and free-riding.8 3
Unfortunately, merely recognizing that broad jurisdictional genuine
fraternity would be required to solve the basic problem of homelessness does
not itself create that fraternity. There can be no guarantee that solving the
problem of involuntary homelessness will be in the direct and immediate
financial interests of all taxpayers. Whether the increased spending will be
invariably fully offset by new efficiencies, and less reliance on expensive
emergency or stop-gap measures, is an empirical matter. We can say, though,
that no such universal solution is likely to arise merely from increasing societal
wealth and the play of market forces. Some element of broad-ranging
fraternity, constitutionally realized, constitutionally stabilized, and constitu-
tionally assured, will be necessary as well.
Once that sufficient degree of broad-jurisdictional universalist fraternity
exists, however, the solution to homelessness will be less of a purely legal or
even constitutional matter than it may now appear to be. Fraternity is hardly
reducible to indifferently regarded official words on paper. Consider the
http://www.oberlin.edu/economic/Papers/HealthConf/.
181 By analogy, the Court in Shapiro v. Thompson did not deny that the availability of more
generous welfare benefits could, like employment or a pleasant climate, attract out-of-staters in
some number; the idea was rather that officially seeking to discourage entry on such grounds is
generally constitutionally illegitimate. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
We need take no position on the actual strength of any range of such incentives, or their effects
on local spending, in the homelessness context.
182 This is not to disparage the subsidiarity value, see supra note 165 and accompanying
text, or of sensible policy adaptation to distinctive local culture and circumstance.
183 Note that it is generally thought that genuine "race to the bottom" problems, as well as
the classic liberal problem of our safe emergence into society from a hazardous assumed state of
nature, typically require an encompassing, broadly inclusive solution changing the various
actors' incentives. For critical discussion, see Steven D. Schwinn, Toward a More Expansive
Welfare Devolution Debate, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 311, 3234-25 (2005); Note, Devolving
Welfare Programs to the States: A Public Choice Perspective, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1984, 1986-
87 (1996); DAVID P. GAUTHIER, THE LOGIC OF LEVIATHAN: THE MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY




contrast between constitutionalized liberty or equality on the one hand and the
idea of fraternity on the other. It is possible for us to enjoy constitutional
liberty, as in the case of the freedom to assemble and speak, despite a certain
indifference or even hostility on the part of the executive branch of the govern-
ment. 184 Similarly, it is possible to enjoy equality with regard to a given
constitutional right, say, in the weight accorded one's electoral vote, despite
legislative branch indifference or even hostility.185
Genuine fraternity, however, of the sort required for a universal solution to
the large scale problem of involuntary homelessness, works a bit differently.
Fraternity is not entirely a matter of official words on paper or even of
outcomes or results. Fraternity also has a dimension of genuine, as opposed to
the mere appearance of, concern and identification. Fraternity thus has a
certain subjective or motivational element that is not usually subject to direct
measurement and command by the law. The law can command us to appear to
care, but not so readily and immediately to actually care. 186 If we do not
genuinely care fraternally, we are not likely to be motivated to change the law
so that we merely appear to be fraternal, or even to change the law in ways that
might eventually make us actually more fraternal. Once we do genuinely
fraternally care sufficiently, however, for whatever reason, the above practical
184 Note the more or less practical constraints on bias built into a march permitted by
Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992).
185 Note the Court's willingness to strike down, as violative of equal protection, legislative
district voting strength disparities of as little as 0.7 percent, as in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S.
725 (1983).
186 The law could, in theory, command and actually carry out a genuine solution to the
problem of homelessness even where we did not feel fraternal toward the homeless. But if we
did not feel sufficient fraternity, it is unclear what other motives not related to fraternity,
including dignity, could realistically suffice. Mere subjective distress, or the aesthetic
unattractiveness of homelessness, can provide motives, but both of these concerns can often be
alleviated more cheaply by merely removing the homeless from public view. For a reference to
Lord Keynes' aesthetic distaste for poverty in general, see James K. Galbraith, The Importance
of Being Sufficiently Equal, in Should Differences in Income and Wealth Matter? 201 (Ellen
Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller & Jeffrey Paul eds. 2002). And there is no guarantee that
universally eradicating homelessness would leave all taxpayers at least as well off as before.
Basic housing may be less expensive than jail or in-patient medical treatment, but more
expensive than leaving the homeless more or less unnoticed to fend for themselves, or leaving
the homeless to some other jurisdiction. For a recent survey, see Will Higgins, Study: House the
Homeless to Cut Costs, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 19, 2007,
available at http://www.indystar.com/apps/pbcs.d I I/article (visited June 20,2007) (discussing
three year study of 96 Indianapolis homeless persons conducted by Professor Eric Wright). For
further discussion of this issue, see generally the Indiana Coalition for Homelessness
Intervention and Prevention website at http://www.chipindy.org.
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obstacles 187 to overcoming homelessness become more manageable. With
sufficient fraternity, these obstacles become mainly problems of coordination
and of reasonable good faith sharing of burdens, and the outlook for the
homeless genuinely brightens.
187 See supra notes 161-83 and accompanying text.
